Moderate Density Parity Check (MDPC) codes are defined here as codes which have a parity-check matrix whose row weight is O( √ n) where n is the length n of the code. They can be decoded like LDPC codes but they decode much less errors than LDPC codes: the number of errors they can decode in this case is of order Θ( √ n). Despite this fact they have been proved very useful in cryptography for devising key exchange mechanisms. They have also been proposed in McEliece type cryptosystems. However in this case, the parameters that have been proposed in [11] were broken in [9] . This attack exploits the fact that the decoding failure probability is non-negligible. We show here that this attack can be thwarted by choosing the parameters in a more conservative way. We first show that such codes can decode with a simple bit-flipping decoder any pattern of O √ n log log n log n errors. This avoids the previous attack at the cost of significantly increasing the key size of the scheme. We then show that under a very reasonable assumption the decoding failure probability decays almost exponentially with the codelength with just two iterations of bit-flipping. With an additional assumption it has even been proved that it decays exponentially with an unbounded number of iterations and we show that in this case the increase of the key size which is required for resisting to the [9] attack is only moderate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually all the public key cryptography used in practice today can be attacked in polynomial time by a quantum computer [12] . Even if such a quantum computer does not exist yet, finding viable solutions which would be resistant to a quantum computer is expected to be a lengthy process. This is one of the reasons why the NIST has recently launched a process for standardizing public key cryptographic algorithms that would be safe against a quantum adversary. Code-based cryptography is believed to be quantum resistant and is therefore considered as a viable solution. The McEliece system [10] based on binary Goppa codes, which is almost as old as RSA, is a public key cryptosystem that falls into this category. It has withstood all cryptanalyses up to now. It is well known to provide extremely fast encryption and fast decryption but has large public keys, about 200 kilobytes for 128 bits of security and slightly less than one megabyte for 256 bits of security [5] .
There have been many attempts to decrease the key size of this system. One of the most satisfying answer up to now has been to use Moderate Density Parity Check (MDPC) codes. This family is very attractive since (i) the decryption algorithm is extremely simple and is based on a very simple bit flipping decoding algorithm, (ii) direct attacks on the key really amount to a problem of the same nature as decoding a linear code. This can be used to give a security proof [11] . However this security proof does not take into account the decoding failure probability. This is not necessarily a problem in a setting where the scheme is used to devise ephemeral keys [1] , [4] . However, in security models where an attacker is allowed to query the decryption oracle many times, this can be a problem as observed by [9] which showed how to attack the parameters proposed in [11] . This attack really exploits the non negligible decoding failure probability of the MDPC codes chosen in [11] . If this probability were as low as 2 −λ where 2 λ is the complexity of the best attack that the scheme has to sustain, then this would not be a problem and the security proof of [4] could be used to show the security of the scheme under this stronger attacking model. This raises the issue whether or not the error probability of MDPC codes can be made extremely small for affordable parameters.
We tackle this issue by giving several different answers to this issue. We study in depth this question in the regime which is particularly interesting for these cryptographic applications, namely when the weight of the parity-check equations is of order O ( √ n) where n is the length of the MDPC code. We define in the whole article MDPC codes in this way Definition 1 (MDPC code). An MDPC code is a binary linear code that admits a parity check matrix whose rows are all of weight O ( √ n) where n is the length of the code. In the case where this parity-check matrix have rows of a same weight w and columns of a same weight v, we say that the parity-check matrix is of type (v, w). By some abuse of terminology, we will also call the corresponding code a code of type (v, w).
We will decode these codes with an even simpler bit-flipping decoding algorithm than the one considered in [11] to simplify the analysis. One round of decoding is just majority-logic decoding based on a sparse parity-check matrix of the code. When we perform just one round of bit-flipping we call this decoder a majority-logic decoder. Recall that a majority logic decoder based on a certain parity-check matrix computes for all bits the number u i of parity-checks that involve the bit i that are unsatisfied. Let n i be the number of parity-checks involving bit i. If for a bit i we have u i > n i /2 (i.e if a strict majority of such parity-checks is violated) the bit gets flipped. We will assume here that the computation of the v i 's is done in parallel so that flipping one bit does not affect the other v j 's. In other words the decoder works as given in Algorithm 1 when we perform N iterations. A crucial quantity will play an important role, namely 
intersection of H is equal to the maximum intersection number of two different columns of H.
The point is that it is readily verified (see Proposition 1) that an MDPC code of type (v, w) corrects all errors of weight ≤ v 2s by majority-logic decoding (i.e. Algorithm 1 with N = 1) when the maximum column intersection is s. What makes this result interesting is that for most MDPC codes the maximum column intersection is really small. We namely prove that for a natural random MDPC code model, the maximum column intersection of the parity-check matrix defining the MDPC code is with high probability of order O log n log log n . Computing the maximum intersection number can obviously be performed in polynomial time and this allows us to give a randomized polynomial time algorithm for constructing MDPC codes of length n and fixed rate R ∈ [0, 1) that correct with the majority-logic decoder any error pattern of size ≤ t(n), where t(n) = Ω √ n log log n log n . Moreover, under a reasonable assumption on the first round of the bit-flipping decoder, the same MDPC codes correct Ω ( √ n) errors with two iterations of a bit-flipping decoder with decoding failure probability of order e −Ω( n log log n log n ) . It should be noted that under an additional assumption on the subsequent iterations of the bit-flipping decoder, it has been proved in [1] that MDPC codes correct Ω ( √ n) errors by performing an unbounded number of bit-flipping iterations with probability of error e −Ω(n) . We also provide some concrete numbers to show that it is possible to construct MDPC codes that avoid completely the attack [9] and for which it is possible to provide a security proof in strong security models with a significant key size overhead when compared to the parameters proposed in [11] if we want to stay in the no-error scenario, with a reasonable overhead if we make the first assumption mentioned above, and moderate overhead if we make both assumptions mentioned above. Note. Most of the results are given without proof, they can be found in the full version of the paper [14] .
II. MAJORITY-LOGIC DECODING AND ITS PERFORMANCE FOR MDPC CODES
We start this section by relating the error-correction capacity of an MDPC code to the maximum column intersection of its defining parity-check matrix, then show that for typical MDPC codes the intersection number is small and that this allows to construct efficiently MDPC codes that correct all patterns of ≤ t(n) errors, where t(n) = Ω √ n log log n log n errors.
A. Error correction capacity of an MDPC code vs. maximum column intersection
Proposition 1. Consider a code with a parity check matrix for which every column has weight at least v and whose maximum column intersection is s. Performing majority-logic decoding based on this matrix (i.e. Algorithm 1 with N = 1) corrects all errors of weight ≤ v 2s . Proof. We denote by H = (h ij ) 1≤i≤r 1≤j≤n the parity-check matrix we use for performing majority-logic decoding and by t the number of errors. We assume that t ≤ v 2s . For i in {1, . . . , r} denote by E i the subset of positions which are in error and in the support of the i-th parity check equation (i.e. h i = 1). We number the parity-check equations of the code from 1 to r.
We consider now what happens to y j in the algorithm. There are two cases to consider. Case 1: y j is erroneous. We can upper-bound the number s j of satisfied parity-check equations involving this bit by the number of parity-check equations involving this bit whose support contains at least 2 errors. We consider now the graph G j which is a bipartite graph associated to j which is constructed as follows. Its set of vertices is the union of the set A j of positions different from j which are in error and the set B j of parity-check equations that involve the position j and whose support contains at least 2 errors. There is an edge between a position in A j and parity-check equation i in B j if and only if the parity-check equation involves , that is h i = 1. Let e j be the number of edges of G j and let n j be the number of parity-check equations involving j. We observe now that
(1) is just the first observation whereas (2) follows from the fact the degree in G j of any vertex is at most s by the assumption on the maximum intersection number of H. Since v/2 ≤ n j /2 it follows that the majority-logic decoder necessarily flips the bit and therefore corrects the corresponding error. Case 2: there is no error in position j. We can upper-bound the number u j of unsatisfied positions in a similar way. This time we consider the graph G j whose vertex set is the union of A j which is the set of positions which are in error and B j the set of parity-check equations involving j and whose support contains this time at least one error. We put an edge between a position in A j and parity-check equation i in B j if and only if the parity-check equation involves . Let e j be the number of edges of G j . Similarly to what we did we observe now that
In other words we will not flip this bit.
B. A random model for MDPC codes of type (v, w)
There are several ways to build random MDPC codes of type (v, w). The one which is used in cryptography [?], [1] - [4] , [7] , [11] is to construct them as quasi-cyclic codes. Our proof technique can also be applied to this case, but since there are several different types of construction of this kind, so that we have to adapt our proof technique to each of those, we will consider a more general model here. It is based on Gallager's construction of LDPC codes [8] . We will construct an r × n random parity-check matrix of type (v, w) by assuming that n is a multiple of w (n = n w), r is a multiple of v (r = r v) and that rw = nv (this condition is necessary in order to obtain a matrix of type (v, w)). Let P n,w be a matrix of size n × n constructed as follows
where I n denotes the identity matrix of size n , 1 w a row vector of length w whose entries are all equal to 1, that is
w times , 0 w a row vector of length w whose entries are all equal to 0. We then choose v permutations of length n at random and they define a parity-check matrix H(π 1 , . . . , π v ) of size r × n of type (v, w) as
where P πi n,w denotes the matrix P n,w whose columns have been permuted with π i . We denote by D r,n,v,w the associated probability distribution of binary matrices of size r × n and type (v, w) we obtain when the π i 's are chosen uniformly at random.
C. The maximum intersection number of matrices drawn according to D r,n,v,w
The maximum intersection number of matrices drawn according to D r,n,v,w turns out to be remarkably small when w and v are of order √ n, it is namely typically of order O log n log log n . To prove this claim we first observe that Lemma 1. Consider a matrix H drawn at random according to the distribution D r,n,v,w . Take two arbitrary columns j and j of H and let n jj be the intersection number of j and j . We have for all t ∈ {0, . . . , v}
We use this to prove the following result Proposition 2. Let α and β be two constants such that 0 < α < β. Assume we draw a parity-check matrix H at random according to the distribution D r,n,v,w where we assume that both v and w satisfy α √ n ≤ v < w ≤ β √ n. Then for any ε > 0 the maximum intersection number of H is smaller than (2 + ε) ln n ln log n with probability 1 − o(1) as n tends to infinity. This together with Proposition 1 implies directly the following corollary Corollary 1. There exists a randomized algorithm working in expected polynomial time outputting for any designed rate R ∈ (0, 1) an MDPC code of rate ≥ R of an arbitrarily large length n and parity-check equations of weight Θ( √ n) that corrects all patterns of errors of size less than γ √ n ln ln n ln n for n large enough, where γ > 0 is some absolute constant.
Proof. The randomized algorithm is very simple. We choose n to be a square n = w 2 for some integer w and let v def = (1 − R)w and r def = nv w . Then we draw a parity-check matrix H at random according to the distribution D r,n,v,w . The corresponding code has clearly rate ≥ R. We compute the maximum column intersection of H. This can be done in time O wn 2 . If this column intersection is greater than (2 + ε) ln n ln ln n we output the corresponding MDPC code, if not we draw at random H again until finding a suitable matrix H. By Proposition 1 we know that such a code can correct all patterns of at most α √ n ln ln n (4+2ε) ln n errors. This implies the corollary.
III. ANALYSIS OF TWO ITERATIONS OF BIT-FLIPPING
We derived in the previous section a condition ensuring that one round of bit-flipping corrects all the errors. We will now estimate the probability that performing one round of bit-flipping corrects enough errors so that another round of bit-flipping will correct all remaining errors. To analyze the first round of decoding we will model intermediate quantities of the bit-flipping algorithm by binomial distributions. More precisely, consider an MDPC code of type (v, w) and length n. The noise model is the following: an error of weight t was chosen uniformly at random and added to the codeword of the MDPC code. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n − t}, let E 0 i be the Bernouilli random variable which is equal to 1 iff the i-th position that was not in error initially is in error after the first round of iterative decoding. We also denote by U 0 i the counter u j associated to the i-th position which was not in error. 
Similarly, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t} we denote by E 1 i the Bernoulli random variable that is equal to 1 iff the i-th bit that was in error initially stays in error after the first round of Algorithm 1. We also define the U 1 i 's and the V 1 ij 's similarly. In this case
. Let us bring in for b ∈ {0, 1}:
It is clear that these probabilities do not depend on i and j and that this definition is consistent. It is (essentially) proved in [1] that
Then
where ε def = e − 2wt n .
We will now make the following assumption that simplifies the analysis Assumption 1. When we use Algorithm 1 on an MDPC code of type (v, w), we assume that • for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − t} the counters U 0 i of Algorithm 1 are distributed like sums of v independent Bernoulli random variables of parameter p 0 at the first iteration and the E 0 i 's are independent; • for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} the counters U 1 i of Algorithm 1 are distributed like sums of v independent Bernoulli random variables of parameter p 1 at the first iteration and the E 1 i 's are independent. The experiments performed in [6] corroborate this assumption for the first iteration of the bit-flipping decoder. To analyze the behavior of Algorithm 1 we will use the following lemma which is just a slight generalization of Lemma 6 in [1] Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1 used for an MDPC code of type (v, w) and when the error is chosen uniformly at random among the errors of weight t, we have for all (b, i) ∈ {0} × {1, . . . , n − t} ∪ {1} × {1, . . . , t},
Under Assumption 1, P(E b i = 1) does not depend on i, we will denote it by
We let
S 0 is the number of errors that were introduced after one round of iterative decoding coming from flipping the n − t bits that were initially correct. Similarly S 1 is the number of errors that are left after one round of iterative decoding coming from not flipping the t bits that were initially incorrect. Let S def = S 0 + S 1 , which represents the total number of errors that are left after the first round of iterative decoding. We quantify the probability that this quantity does not decay enough by the following theorem which holds under Assumption 1. 
From this theorem we deduce that Corollary 2. Provided that Assumption 1 holds, we can construct in expected polynomial time for any designed rate R ∈ (0, 1) an MDPC code of rate ≥ R of an arbitrarily large length n and parity-check equations of weight Θ( √ n) where the probability of error P e after two iterations of bit-flipping is upper-bounded by e −Ω(n ln ln n ln n ) when there are t = Θ( √ n) errors.
Proof. We use the construction given in the proof of Corollary 1 to construct an MDPC code of type (v, w) of length n = w 2 and with v def = (1 − R)w that allows to correct all patterns of errors of size less than γ √ n ln ln n ln n for n large enough, where γ > 0 is some absolute constant with just one round of the bit-flipping decoder of Algorithm 1. Then we use Theorem 1 to show that with probability upper-bounded by e −Ω(n ln ln n ln n ) there remains at most γ √ n ln ln n ln n errors after one round of Algorithm 1. This proves the corollary.
In [1] there is an additional assumption which is made which is that the probability of error is dominated by the probability that the first round of decoding is not able to decrease the number by some mutiplicative factor α. With the notation of this section, this assumption can be described as follows.
Assumption 2. There exists some constant α > 0 such that the probability of error P err for an unbounded number of iterations of Algorithm 1 is upper-bounded by P(S ≥ αt) where S is the number of errors that are left after the first round of Algorithm 1 and t is the initial number of errors.
This assumption also agrees with the experiments performed in [6] . With this additional assumption (Assumption 1 is actually also made) it is proven in [1] that the probability of errors decays exponentially when t = Θ( √ n). This is actually obtained by a slightly less general version of Theorem 1 (see [1, Theorem 1] ).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we provide numerical results showing how much we have to increase the parameters proposed in [11] in order to obtain a probability of error which is below 2 −λ where λ is the security parameter (i.e. 2 λ should be the complexity of the best attacks on the scheme). The upper-bound on the probability that the maximum column intersection is larger than some bound coming from using Lemma 1 together with an obvious union-bound is a little bit loose, and we performed numerical tests in order to estimate the maximum column intersection. To speed-up the calculation and at the same time to be closer to the cryptographic applications we considered the particular code structure used in [1] , [4] , [11] , namely a quasi-cyclic code whose parity-chack matrix H is formed by two circulant blocks H 0 and H 1 , i.e. H = H 0 H 1 . The weight of the rows of H 0 and H 1 was chosen to be w/2 (with w even) so that we have a code of type (w/2, w). The maximum column intersection s given in Table I corresponds to the smallest number s 0 such that more than 20% of the parity-check matrices had a maximum column intersection ≤ s 0 . We considered several scenarios: -Scenario I, Algorithm 1 with N = 1 and a zero-error decoding failure P err probability when there are t errors; -Scenario II: Algorithm 1 with N = 2 and a non-zero decoding failure probability upper-bounded by making Assumption 1 when there are t errors, -Scenario III, Algorithm 1 with N > 2 and a non-zero decoding failure probability when there are t errors which is upper-bounded by making Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 for α = 0.5; -Scenario IV, Algorithm 1 with N > 2 and a non-zero decoding failure probability when there are t errors which is upper-bounded by making Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 for α = 0.75. This should be compared with the original parameters proposed for a security level λ = 80 in [11] that were broken in [9] , namely n = 9602, w = 90, t = 84. We have chosen t = 84 in all cases. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study shows that it is possible to devise MDPC codes with zero or very small error probability, and in the last case it comes at an affordable cost for cryptographic applications and this by making assumptions that are corroborated by experimental evidence [6] . There are obviously several ways to improve our results. The first would be to use slightly more sophisticated decoding techniques and/or more sophisticated analyses when we want a zero-error probability. The maximum column intersection gives a lower bound on the expansion of the Tanner graph and this can be used to study the bitflipping algorithm considered in [13] . This would not improve the lower-bound on the error-correction capacity however, but suggests that refined considerations and decoding algorithms should be able to improve the error-correction capacity in the worst case. Moreover, in order to simplify the analysis and the discussion we have considered a very simple decoder. The probability of error can already be lowered rather significantly by choosing in a slightly better way the threshold in Step 7 in Algorithm 1 and it is clear that more sophisticated decoding techniques will be able to lower the probability of error significantly (see [6] for instance). This suggests that it should be possible to improve rather significantly the parameters proposed in Table I. 
